Threats to Sports Venues and Athletes

Sport venue managers need to be aware of risk assessment methodologies to detect threats identify vulnerabilities, and reduce consequences, as the UK terrorism threat level is raised to severe.

On November 15, the United Kingdom’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) raised the UK’s national terrorism threat level from “substantial” to “severe.” The change reflects the JTAC’s assessment that the threat of a terrorist attack in the UK had changed from “likely” to “highly likely”.

The decision was made in the wake of two recent terrorist attacks in the UK. The first was the October 15, 2021 murder of Sir David Amess, a member of the British Parliament who was stabbed multiple times by a Syrian refugee while meeting with constituents in Leigh-on-Sea.

The second incident was a failed suicide bombing attack against the Liverpool Women’s Hospital on November 14. In that case, the attacker took a taxi to the hospital, but his device detonated prematurely before he could enter the hospital. The would-be attacker was killed but the taxi driver was only lightly injured in the incident, and it appears the bomb was poorly constructed, causing more incendiary than explosive damage.

With the JTAC raising the threat level to severe and given the persistent threat of terrorism in the rest of Europe and the developed world, it is a good time to examine the threat posed by terrorists to sporting venues.

Location, Location, Location

Real estate agents say that there are three main elements that drive real estate prices: location, location, and location. The same thing is true for terrorism threats – location makes a great deal of difference in assessing the terrorism threat. This is primarily due to three factors: the terrorist threat actors who are active in a geographic area; their access to weapons and explosives; and the capabilities of the security forces. For example, due to the number of terrorist actors active in Pakistan, their easy access to weapons and explosives, and the limitations of the security forces, the threat level for a cricket match in Pakistan would be far higher than that of a match in Australia or Wales.

Terrorist groups, to include jihadist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have worked to conduct attacks in the developed world. Examples include the 9/11 attacks and the November 2015 Paris attacks that began with an attack at the Stade de France during a match between France and Germany. However, due to the successful efforts by security services to identify and disrupt larger terrorist organizations, at the present time, the primary threat of terrorism in the developed world stems from self-initiated, grassroots terrorists who are sympathetic to terrorist causes but who have little or no formal connection to professional terrorist groups. This applies to terrorists motivated by all types of ideologies to include neo-Naziism, anarchism, and jihadism. Examples of such attacks include the 2019 attack against a synagogue by a neo-Nazi in Halle Germany, and the 2019 attack against the Fishmonger’s Hall in London.  

The Limits of Grassroots Operatives

While grassroots terrorists can be a challenge for the authorities to identify due to their lack of connections to formal terrorist groups, their lack of association also means that they typically are bereft of terrorist tradecraft skills such as bomb building and attack planning. Because of this, they are less capable than professional terrorist cadres. Due to this lack of capability, they tend to attack lightly defended “soft” targets rather than better defended venues.

In a sporting venue context, this means that attackers are unlikely to be able to get inside a large stadium to conduct an attack. Instead, they are far more likely to attack the crowds near security checkpoints outside of the stadium, either before or after an event. Indeed, this is the type of attack that was launched against an Ariana Grande concert at the Manchester Arena in 2017 where the attacker detonated his suicide device in the midst of the crowd as they exited the event. Even in the 2015 Paris attacks that involved trained Islamic State terrorists dispatched from Syria, the attackers were not able to make it into the Stade de France, which was one of their intended targets. Instead, the bomber was forced to detonate his device outside of the venue, killing one bystander.

But bombs are not the only weapons that can be used to attack crowds outside sporting venues. Other weapons such as knives, vehicles and even firearms can also be used, and indeed we have seen all of them used in recent terrorist attacks in the developed world.

Athletes and sports team employees could find themselves exposed to an attack directed against crowds outside sporting venues and are therefore encouraged to minimize the time they spend outside the security perimeter prior to, or after, a sporting event.

Targeted Attacks

But mass attacks against crowds are not the only threat posed by grassroots attackers. As seen by the recent attack against David Amess and the murder of MP Jo Cox in 2016, targeted attacks are also within their capabilities. Such an attack could occur near the target’s home, or as in the murders of Cox and Amess, near or during a scheduled public appearance.

This highlights the need to practice heightened situational awareness before and after public appearances. The fact that grassroots terrorists generally possess poor surveillance tradecraft means that they are normally easy to spot as they conduct surveillance before an attack – but only if one is looking for them.  

The possibility of targeted attacks also demonstrates the need to “live gray” [link to PSN piece] on the Internet in order to limit the information a potential attacker can gather to plan an attack against an athlete, such as where the athlete lives or where the athlete will be at a particular time. It is important to avoid providing a potential attacker with information that allows them to connect the dots of the “triangle of vulnerability.”

Fortunately, the threat of terrorism to athletes and sporting venues is limited in the developed world. By taking a few simple measures such as practicing good situational awareness and practicing good cyber habits, athletes and sports team employees can help protect themselves from this threat.